Act Utilitarianism Essay Example for Free

Act Utilitarianism Essay Utilitarianism is a theory in normative ethics holding that the proper course of action is the one that maximizes overall happiness. It is now generally taken to be a form of consequentialism, although when Anscombe first introduced that term it was to distinguish between old-fashioned Utilitarianism and consequentialism. [1] According to utilitarianism the moral worth of an action is determined only by its resulting outcome although there is debate over how much consideration should be given to actual consequences, foreseen consequences and intended consequences. Two influential contributors to this theory are Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill. In A Fragment on Government Bentham says ‘it is the greatest happiness of the greatest number that is the measure of right and wrong’ and describes this as a fundamental axiom. In An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation he talks of ‘the principle of utility’ but later prefers â€Å"the greatest happiness principle. [2][3] Utilitarianism can be characterized as a quantitative and reductionist approach to ethics. It is a type of naturalism. [4] It can be contrasted with deontological ethics,[5] which does not regard the consequences of an act as a determinant of its moral worth; virtue ethics,[6] which primarily focuses on acts and habits leading to happiness; pragmatic ethics; as well as with ethical egoism and other varieties of consequentialism. [7] Utilitarianism has often been considered the natural ethic of a democracy operating by simple majority without protection of individual rights. [8] Early utilitarianism The importance of happiness as an end for humans has long been recognized. Forms of hedonism were put forward by Aristippus and Epicurus; Aristotle argued that eudaimonia is the highest human good and Augustine wrote that all men agree in desiring the last end, which is happiness. Happiness was also explored in depth by Aquinas[9][10][11][12][13] However, utilitarianism as a distinct ethical position only emerged in the eighteenth century. Although utilitarianism is usually thought to start with Jeremy Bentham there were earlier writers who presented theories that were strikingly similar. In An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals David Hume writes: In all determinations of morality, this circumstance of public utility is ever principally in view; and wherever disputes arise, either in philosophy or common life, concerning the bounds of duty, the question cannot, by any means, be decided with greater certainty, than by ascertaining, on any side, the true interests of mankind. [14] Hume had studied under Francis Hutcheson and it was he who first introduced a key utilitarian phrase. In An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue (1725) Hutcheson writes, In comparing the moral qualitys of actions, in order to regulate our election among various actions proposed, or to find which of them has the greatest moral excellency, we are led by our moral sense of virtue to judge thus; that in equal degrees of happiness, expected to proceed from the action, the virtue is in proportion to the number of persons to whom the happiness shall extend (and here the dignity, or moral importance of persons, may compensate numbers); And in equal numbers, the virtue is as the quantity of the happiness, or natural good; or that the virtue is in a compound ratio of the quantity of good, and number of enjoyers. In the same manner, the moral evil, or vice, is as the degree of misery, and number of sufferers; so that, that action is best, which procures the greatest happiness for the greatest numbers; and that, worst, which, in like manner, occasions misery. [15]. In the first three editions of the book Hutcheson followed this passage with various mathematical algorithms â€Å"to compute the Morality of any Actions†. In this he pre-figured the hedonic calculus of Bentham. It is claimed[16] that the first systematic theory of utilitarian ethics was developed by John Gay. In Concerning the Fundamental Principle of Virtue or Morality (1731) Gay argues that. Utilitarianism â€Å"happiness, private happiness, is the proper or ultimate end of all our actions†¦ each particular action may be said to have its proper and peculiar end†¦(but)†¦. they still tend or ought to tend to something farther; as is evident from hence, viz. that a man may ask and expect a reason why either of them are pursued: now to ask the reason of any action or pursuit, is only to enquire into the end of it: but to expect a reason, i. e. an end, to be assigned for an ultimate end, is absurd. To ask why I pursue happiness, will admit of no other answer than an explanation of the terms. †[17] This pursuit of happiness is given a theological basis: â€Å"Now it is evident from the nature of God, viz.his being infinitely happy in himself from all eternity, and from his goodness manifested in his works, that he could have no other design in creating mankind than their happiness; and therefore he wills their happiness; therefore the means of their happiness: therefore that my behaviour, as far as it may be a means of the happiness of mankind, should be such†¦thus the will of God is the immediate criterion of Virtue, and the happiness of mankind the criterion of the wilt of God; and therefore the happiness of mankind may be said to be the criterion of virtue, but once removed†¦(and)†¦ I am to do whatever lies in my power towards promoting the happiness of mankind. [18] Gay’s theological utilitarianism was developed and popularized by William Paley. It has been claimed that Paley was not a very original thinker and that the philosophical part of his treatise on ethics is â€Å"an assemblage of ideas developed by others and is presented to be learned by students rather than debated by colleagues. †[19] Nevertheless, his book The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy (1785) was a required text at Cambridge[19] and Smith says that Paley’s writings were â€Å"once as well known in American colleges as were the readers and spellers of William McGuffey and Noah Webster in the elementary schools. †[20] Although now largely missing from the philosophical canon, Schneewind writes that utilitarianism first became widely known in England through the work of William Paley. [21] The now forgotten significance of Paley can be judged from the title of Birks 1874 work Modern Utilitarianism or the Systems of Paley, Bentham and Mill Examined and Compared. Apart from restating that happiness as an end is grounded in the nature of God, Paley also discusses the place of rules. He writes, â€Å"†¦actions are to be estimated by their tendency. Whatever is expedient, is right. It is the utility of any moral rule alone, which constitutes the obligation of it. Modern Utilitarianism by T. R. Birks 1874 2 But to all this there seems a plain objection, viz. that many actions are useful, which no man in his senses will allow to be right. There are occasions, in which the hand of the assassin would be very useful†¦ The true answer is this; that these actions, after all, are not useful, and for that reason, and that alone, are not right. To see this point perfectly, it must be observed that the bad consequences of actions are twofold, particular and general. The particular bad consequence of an action, is the mischief which that single action directly and immediately occasions. The general bad consequence is, the violation of some necessary or useful general rule†¦ You cannot permit one action and forbid another, without showing a difference between them. Consequently, the same sort of actions must be generally permitted or generally forbidden. Where, Utilitarianism therefore, the general permission of them would be pernicious, it becomes necessary to lay down and support the rule which generally forbids them. †[22] 3 Classical utilitarianism Jeremy Bentham Benthams book An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation was printed in 1780 but not published until 1789. It is possible that Bentham was spurred on to publish after he saw the success of Paley’s The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy. [23] Benthams book was not an immediate success[24] but his ideas were spread further when Pierre Etienne Louis Dumont translated edited selections from a variety of Benthams manuscripts into French. Traite de legislation civile et penale was published in 1802 and then later retranslated back into English by Hildreth as The Theory of Legislation, although by this time significant portions of Dumont’s work had already been retranslated and incorporated into Sir John Bowrings edition of Benthams works, which was issued in parts between 1838 and 1843. Benthams work opens with a statement of the principle of utility, â€Å"Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do†¦ By the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever according to the tendency it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question: or, what is the same thing in other words to promote or to oppose that happiness. I say of every action whatsoever, and therefore not only of every action of a private individual, but of every measure of government. †[25] In Chapter IV Bentham introduces a method of calculating the value of pleasures and pains, which has come to be known as the hedonic calculus. Bentham says that the value of a pleasure or pain, considered by itself, can be measured according to its intensity, duration, certainty/uncertainty and propinquity/remoteness. In addition, it is necessary to consider â€Å"the tendency of any act by which it is produced† and, therefore, to take account of the act’s fecundity, or the chance it has of being followed by sensations of the same kind and its purity, or the chance it has of not being followed by sensations of the opposite kind. Finally, it is necessary to consider the extent, or the number of people affected by the action. Perhaps aware that Hutcheson eventually removed his algorithms for calculating the greatest happiness because they â€Å"appear’d useless, and were disagreeable to some readers†[26] Bentham contends that there is nothing novel or unwarranted about his method for â€Å"in all this there is nothing but what the practice of mankind, wheresoever they have a clear view of their own interest, is perfectly conformable to. † Rosen warns that descriptions of utilitarianism can bear â€Å"little resemblance historically to utilitarians like Bentham and J. S. Mill† and can be more â€Å"a crude version of act utilitarianism conceived in the twentieth century as a straw man to be attacked and rejected. †[27] It is a mistake to think that Bentham is not concerned with rules. His seminal work is concerned with the principles of legislation and the hedonic calculus is introduced with the words â€Å"Pleasures then, and the avoidance of pains, are the ends that the legislator has in view. † In Chapter VII Bentham says, â€Å"The business of government is to promote the happiness of the society, by punishing and rewarding†¦ In proportion as an act tends to disturb that happiness, in proportion as the tendency of it is pernicious, will be the demand it creates for punishment. † The question then arises as to when, if at all, it might legitimate to break the law. This is considered in The Theory of Legislation where Bentham distinguishes between evils of the first and second orders. Those of the first order are the more immediate consequences; those of the second are when the consequences spread through the community causing ‘alarm’ and ‘danger’. Utilitarianism â€Å"It is true there are cases in which, if we confine ourselves to the effects of the first order, the good will have an incontestable preponderance over the evil. Were the offence considered only under this point of view, it would not be easy to assign any good reasons to justify the rigour of the laws. Every thing depends upon the evil of the second order; it is this which gives to such actions the character of crime, and which makes punishment necessary. Let us take, for example, the physical desire of satisfying hunger. Let a beggar, pressed by hunger, steal from a rich mans house a loaf, which perhaps saves him from starving, can it be possible to compare the good which the thief acquires for himself, with the evil which the rich man suffers? †¦ It is not on account of the evil of the first order that it is necessary to erect these actions into offences, but on account of the evil of the second order. †[28] 4 John Stuart Mill Mill was brought up as a Benthamite with the explicit intention that would carry on the cause of utilitarianism. [29] Mills book Utilitarianism first appeared as a series of three articles published in Frasers Magazine in 1861 and was reprinted as a single book in 1863. Higher and lower pleasures Mill rejects a purely quantitative measurement of utility and says, â€Å"It is quite compatible with the principle of utility to recognise the fact, that some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others. It would be absurd that while, in estimating all other things, quality is considered as well as quantity, the estimation of pleasures should be supposed to depend on quantity alone. †[30] Mill notes that, contrary to what its critics might say, there is â€Å"no known Epicurean theory of life which does not assign to the pleasures of the intellect†¦ a much higher value as pleasures than to those of mere sensation. † However, he accepts that this is usually because the intellectual pleasures are thought to have circumstantial advantages, i. e. â€Å"greater permanency, safety, uncostliness, c. † Instead, Mill will argue that some pleasures are intrinsically better than others. The accusation that hedonism is â€Å"doctrine worthy only of swine† has a long history. In Nicomachean Ethics (Book 1 Chapter 5) Aristotle says that identifying the good with pleasure is to prefer a life suitable for beasts. The theological utilitarians had the option of grounding their pursuit of happiness in the will of God; the hedonistic utilitarians needed a different defense. Mill’s approach is to argue that the pleasures of the intellect are intrinsically superior to physical pleasures. Few human creatures would consent to be changed into any of the lower animals, for a promise of the fullest allowance of a beasts pleasures; no intelligent human being would consent to be a fool, no instructed person would be an ignoramus, no person of feeling and conscience would be selfish and base, even though they should be persuaded that the fool, the dunce, or the rascal is better satisfied with his lot than they are with theirs†¦ A being of higher faculties requires more to make him happy, is capable probably of more acute suffering, and is certainly accessible to it at more points, than one of an inferior type; but in spite of these liabilities, he can never really wish to sink into what he feels to be a lower grade of existence†¦ It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, are of a different opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the question†¦ [31] Mill argues that if people who are â€Å"competently acquainted† with two pleasures show a decided preference for one even if it be accompanied by more discontent and â€Å"would not resign it for any quantity of the other† then it is legitimate to regard that pleasure as being superior in quality. Mill recognises that these ‘competent judges’ will not always agree, in which case the judgment of the majority is to be accepted as final. Mill also acknowledges that â€Å"many who are capable of the higher pleasures, occasionally, under the influence of temptation, postpone them to the Utilitarianism lower. But this is quite compatible with a full appreciation of the intrinsic superiority of the higher. † Mill says that this appeal to those who have experienced the relevant pleasures is no different to what must happen when assessing the quantity of pleasure for there is no other way of measuring â€Å"the acutest of two pains, or the intensest of two pleasurable sensations. † Mills proof of the principle of utility In Chapter Four of Utilitarianism Mill considers what proof can be given for the Principle of Utility. He says’ â€Å" The only proof capable of being given that an object is visible, is that people actually see it. The only proof that a sound is audible, is that people hear it In like manner, I apprehend, the sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable, is that people do actually desire it†¦ No reason can be given why the general happiness is desirable, except that each person, so far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his own happiness†¦ we have not only all the proof which the case admits of, but all which it is possible to require, that happiness is a good: that each persons happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate of all persons. †[32] It is usual[33] to say that Mill is committing a number of fallacies. He is accused of committing the naturalistic fallacy, because he is trying to deduce what people ought to do from what they do in fact do; the fallacy of equivocation, because he moves from the fact that something is desirable(1), i. e. is capable of being desired, to the claim that it is desirable(2), i. e.that it ought to be desired; and the fallacy of composition, because the fact that people desire their own happiness does not imply that the aggregate of all persons will desire the general happiness. Hall[34] and Popkin[35] defend Mill against this accusation pointing out that he begins Chapter Four by asserting that â€Å"that questions of ultimate ends do not admit of proof, in the ordinary acceptation of the term† and that this is â€Å"common to all first principles. † According to Hall and Popkin, therefore, Mill does not attempt to â€Å"establish that what people do desire is desirable but merely attempts to make the principles acceptable. †[33] The type of â€Å"proof† Mill is offering consists only of some considerations which, Mill thought, might induce an honest and reasonable man to accept utilitarianism. [33] Having claimed that people do, in fact, desire happiness Mill now has to show that it is the only thing they desire. Mill anticipates the objection that people desire other things such as virtue. He argues that whilst people might start desiring virtue as a means to happiness, eventually, it becomes part of someone’s happiness and is then desired as an end in itself. The principle of utility does not mean that any given pleasure, as music, for instance, or any given exemption from pain, as for example health, are to be looked upon as means to a collective something termed happiness, and to be desired on that account. They are desired and desirable in and for themselves; besides being means, they are a part of the end. Virtue, according to the utilitarian doctrine, is not naturally and originally part of the end, but it is capable of becoming so; and in those who love it disinterestedly it has become so, and is desired and cherished, not as a means to happiness, but as a part of their happiness. [36] 5 Utilitarianism 6 Twentieth century developments Ideal Utilitarianism The description Ideal Utilitarianism was first used by Hastings Rashdall in The Theory of Good and Evil (1907) but is more often associated with G. E. Moore. In Ethics (1912) Moore rejected a purely hedonistic utilitarianism and argued that there is a range of values that might be maximized. Moore’s strategy was to show that it is intuitively implausible that pleasure is the sole measure of what is good. He says that such an assumption, â€Å" involves our saying, for instance, that a world in which absolutely nothing except pleasure existed—no knowledge, no love, no enjoyment of beauty, no moral qualities—must yet be intrinsically better—better worth creating—provided only the total quantity of pleasure in it were the least bit greater, than one in which all these things existed as well as pleasure. † â€Å"It involves our saying that, even if the total quantity of pleasure in each was exactly equal, yet the fact that all the beings in the one possessed in addition knowledge of many different kinds and a full appreciation of all that was beautiful or worthy of love in their world, whereas none of the beings in the other possessed any of these things, would give us no reason whatever for preferring the former to the latter. †[37] Moore admits that it is impossible to prove the case either way but believed that it was intuitively obvious that even if the amount of pleasure stayed the same a world that contained such things as beauty and love would be a better world. He adds that if anybody took the contrary view then â€Å"I think it is self-evident that he would be wrong. †[37] Act and rule utilitarianism In the mid-twentieth century a number of philosophers focused on the place of rules in utilitarian thinking. [38] It was already accepted that it is necessary to use rules to help you choose the right action because the problems of calculating the consequences on each and every occasion would almost certainly result in you frequently choosing something less than the best course of action. Paley had justified the use of rules and Mill says, â€Å"It is truly a whimsical supposition that, if mankind were agreed in considering utility to be the test of morality, they would remain without any agreement as to what is useful, and would take no measures for having their notions on the subject taught to the young, and enforced by law and opinion†¦ to consider the rules of morality as improvable, is one thing; to pass over the intermediate generalisations entirely, and endeavour to test each individual action directly by the first principle, is another†¦ The proposition that happiness is the end and aim of morality, does not mean that no road ought to be laid down to that goal†¦ Nobody argues that the art of navigation is not founded on astronomy, because sailors cannot wait to calculate the Nautical Almanack. Being rational creatures, they go to sea with it ready calculated; and all rational creatures go out upon the sea of life with their minds made up on the common questions of right and wrong. †[39] However, rule utilitarianism proposes a more central role for rules that was thought to rescue the theory from some of its more devastating criticisms, particularly problems to do with justice and promise keeping. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s articles were published both for and against the new form of utilitarianism and through this debate the theory we now call rule utilitarianism was created. In an introduction to an anthology of these articles the editor was able to say, â€Å"The development of this theory was a dialectical process of formulation, criticism, reply and reformulation; the record of this process well illustrates the co-operative development of a philosophical theory. †[40] Smart[41] and McCloskey[42] initially used the terms extreme and restricted utilitarianism but eventually everyone settled on the terms act and rule utilitarianism. The essential difference is in what determines whether or not an action is the right action. Act utilitarianism maintains that an action is right if it maximises utility; rule utilitarianism maintains that an action is right if it Utilitarianism conforms to a rule that maximises utility. In 1953 Urmson published an influential article[43] arguing that Mill justified rules on utilitarian principles. From then on articles have debated this interpretation of Mill. In all probability it was not a distinction that Mill was particularly trying to make and so the evidence in his writing is inevitably mixed. In 1977 a collection of Mill’s writing was published which included a letter in which he said: â€Å"I agree with you that the right way of testing actions by their consequences, is to test them by the natural consequences of the particular action, and not by those which would follow if everyone did the same. But, for the most part, the consideration of what would happen if everyone did the same, is the only means we have of discovering the tendency of the act in the particular case. †[44] This seems to tip the balance in favour of saying that Mill is best classified as an act utilitarian. Some school level textbooks and at least one UK examination board[45] make a further distinction between strong and weak rule utilitarianism. However, it is not clear that this distinction is made in the academic literature. It has been argued that rule utilitarianism collapses into act utilitarianism, because for any given rule, in the case where breaking the rule produces more utility, the rule can be refined by the addition of a sub-rule that handles cases like the exception. [46] This process holds for all cases of exceptions, and so the ‘rules’ have as many ‘sub-rules’ as there are exceptional cases, which, in the end, makes an agent seek out whatever outcome produces the maximum utility. [47] 7 Two-level Utilitarianism In Principles (1973)[48] R. M. Hare accepts that rule utilitarianism collapses into act utilitarianism but claims that this is a result of allowing the rules to be as specific and un-general as we please. He argues that one of the main reasons for introducing rule utilitarianism was to do justice to the general rules that people need for moral education and character development and he proposes that â€Å"a difference between act-utilitarianism and rule-utilitarianism can be introduced by limiting the specificity of the rules, i. e. , by increasing their generality. †[49] This distinction between a ‘specific rule utilitarianism’ (which collapses into act utilitarianism) and ‘general rule utilitarianism’ forms the basis of Hare’s two-level utilitarianism. When we are ‘playing God or the ideal observer’ we use the specific form and we will need to do this when we are deciding what general principles to teach and follow. When we are ‘inculcating’ or in situations where the biases of our human nature are likely to prevent us doing the calculations properly, then we should use the more general rule utilitarianism. Hare argues that in practice, most of the time, we should be following the general principles: â€Å"One ought to abide by the general principles whose general inculcation is for the best; harm is more likely to come, in actual moral situations, from questioning these rules than from sticking to them, unless the situations are very extra-ordinary; the results of sophisticated felicific calculations are not likely, human nature and human ignorance being what they are, to lead to the greatest utility. †[50] In Moral Thinking (1981) Hare illustrated the two extremes. The archangel is the hypothetical person who has perfect knowledge of the situation and no personal biases or weaknesses and always uses critical moral thinking to decide the right thing to do; the ‘prole’ is the hypothetical person who is completely incapable of critical thinking and uses nothing but intuitive moral thinking and, of necessity, has to follow the general moral rules they have been taught or learned through imitation. [51] It is not that some people are archangels and others proles but rather â€Å"we all share the characteristics of both to limited and varying degrees and at different times. †[51] Hare does not specify when we should think more like an archangel and more like a prole as this will, in any case, vary from person to person. However, the critical moral thinking underpins and informs the more intuitive moral thinking. It is responsible for formulating and, if necessary, reformulating the general moral rules. We also switch to critical thinking when trying to deal with unusual situations or in cases where the intuitive moral rules give Utilitarianism conflicting advice. 8 Preference utilitarianism Preference utilitarianism was first put forward in 1977 by John Harsanyi in Morality and the theory of rational behaviour[52] but it is more commonly associated with R. M. Hare,[51] Peter Singer[53] and Richard Brandt. [54] Harsanyi claimed that his theory is indebted to Adam Smith, who equated the moral point of view with that of an impartial but sympathetic observer; to Kant who insisted on the criterion of universality and which may also be described as a criterion of reciprocity; to the classical utilitarians who made maximising social utility the basic criterion of morality; and to ‘the modern theory of rational behaviour under risk and uncertainty, usually described as Bayesian decision theory’. [55] Harsanyi rejects hedonistic utilitarianism as being dependent on an outdated psychology saying that it is far from obvious that everything we do is motivated by a desire to maximise pleasure and minimise pain. He also rejects ideal utilitarianism because â€Å"it is certainly not true as an empirical observation that people’s only purpose in life is to have ‘mental states of intrinsic worth’. †[56] According to Harsanyi, â€Å"preference utilitarianism is the only form of utilitarianism consistent with the important philosophical principle of preference autonomy. By this I mean the principle that, in deciding what is good and what is bad for a given individual, the ultimate criterion can only be his own wants and his own preferences. †[57] Harsanyi adds two caveats. People sometimes have irrational preferences. To deal with this Harsanyi distinguishes between ‘manifest’ preferences and ‘true’ preferences. The former are those â€Å"manifested by his observed behaviour, including preferences possibly based on erroneous factual beliefs, or on careless logical analysis, or on strong emotions that at the moment greatly hinder rational choice† whereas the latter are â€Å"the preferences he would have if he had all the relevant factual information, always reasoned with the greatest possible care, and were in a state of mind most conducive to rational choice. †[57] It is the latter that preference utilitarianism tries to satisfy. The second caveat is that antisocial preferences such as sadism, envy and resentment have to be excluded. Harsanyi achieves this by claiming that such preferences partially exclude those people from the moral community. â€Å"Utilitarian ethics makes all of us members of the same moral community. A person displaying ill will toward others does remain a member of this community, but not with his whole personality. That part of his personality that harbours these hostile antisocial feelings must be excluded from membership, and has no claim for a hearing when it comes to defining our concept of social utility. †[58] More varieties of utilitarianism Negative utilitarianism In The Open Society and its Enemies (1945), Karl Popper argued that the principle maximize pleasure should be replaced by minimize pain. He thought â€Å"it is not only impossible but very dangerous to attempt to maximize the pleasure or the happiness of the people, since such an attempt must lead to totalitarianism. †[59] He claimed that, â€Å"there is, from the ethical point of view, no symmetry between suffering and happiness, or between pain and pleasure†¦ In my opinion human suffering makes a direct moral appeal, namely, the appeal for help, while there is no similar call to increase the happiness of a man who is doing well anyway. A further criticism of the Utilitarian formula ‘Maximize pleasure’ is that it assumes a continuous pleasure-pain scale which allows us to treat degrees of pain as negative degrees of pleasure. But, from the moral point of view, pain cannot be outweighed by pleasure, and especially not one man’s pain by another man’s pleasure. Instead of the greatest happiness for the greatest number, one should demand, more modestly, the least amount of avoidable suffering for all †[60] Utilitarianism The actual term Negative Utilitarianism was introduced by R. N. Smart as the title to his 1958 reply to Popper[61] in which he argued that the principle would entail seeking the quickest and least painful method of killing the entirety of humanity. â€Å"Suppose that a ruler controls a weapon capable of instantly and painlessly destroying the human race. Now it is empirically certain that there would be some suffering before all those alive on any proposed destruction day were to die in the natural course of events. Consequently the use of the weapon is bound to diminish suffering, and would be the rulers duty on NU grounds. †[62] Negative utilitarianism would seem to call.